Thirty First Distinction

Single Question. Whether Charity Remains in the Fatherland such as not to be Extinguished

1. About the thirty first distinction I aska whether charity remains in the fatherland such that it is not extinguished.

a.a [Interpolation] About the thirty first distinction, where the Master deals with charity as to its duration, the question asked is whether...

2. That it does not remain:

The Apostle’s reason in 1 Corinthians 13.8-10 that the other gifts are extinguished is that they are partial, “For we know in part etc.” But charity now is partial because it is imperfect; otherwise, since beatitude consists in it, one would now be blessed.

3. But if it be said that beatitude does not consist in the habit of charity but in its act, then on the contrary: An act can be elicited in proportion to the perfection of the habit, and so, if the habit is now equal to what will be had in the fatherland, then the act will be equal likewise, and enjoyment now will be as intense and as perfect as it will be then.

4. Further, faith is extinguished because it is about a hidden object; but charity is about the same object;     therefore etc     .

5. Further, Augustine in 83 Questions 48 says, “Some matters of faith are never known to be the case.” If faith is now had of these things by wayfarers, some grasp can be had of them in the fatherland - and this grasp can only be faith because these things can only be believed. Therefore faith as to these things at least is not extinguished.

6. Further, the habit with which I grasp a thing is the same habit as I rest in when I possess it [cf. d.26 n.10], for according to Augustine On the Trinity 9.12 n.18, “the desire of the yearner becomes the love of the enjoyer,” and this is much plainer about the habit. It is also proved by similarity with natural things, because the same form is the principle for a things’ moving to the term and for its resting in it. Therefore, since hope is the habit of desiring the infinite good, the same habit will be the reason for resting in it when had, and so it will not be extinguished.

7. On the contrary:

The Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13.8 seems to be for the opposite.

I. To the Question

A. On Faith and Hope

8. No habit to be posited in the fatherland is to remain there in vain; but a habit whose inclination would then be impossible is in vain. Now faith in its idea inclines only to a non-apparent and hidden good, according to Hebrews 11.1, “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” And hope inclines only to a good advantageous for desiring, according to Romans 8.24, “Hope which is seen is not hope,” taking hope for the thing hoped for and for its object. Now these inclinations will not be able to be had in the fatherland, where the Good will be evident and possessed. Therefore these habits will not remain or be there, because they would be superfluous.

9. But there is a doubt here, namely will these virtues be extinguished because things incompossible with them will succeed to them?

10. I reply that there is no need that other habits succeed to them, speaking of habit properly as act differs from habit, for, as was said above in the material about the soul of Christ [d.14 nn.25-30], it is not necessary to posit in Christ’s soul a distinct and created habit, different, that is, from charity, which would be the principle of his seeing and tending to the object. For habits are only posited in a power to habituate and facilitate it [d.33 n.25, I d.17 nn.7, 48-51], and not for eliciting the act - or at least not posited in the intellect so that the object be present to the intellect and so that the intellect be able to operate about it quickly and easily, which it would not be able to do if there were in any act a new object or an object to be newly acquired. For the object will always be present in the fatherland and always acting actually on the power, and the power will be supremely inclined and facilitated.

11. But if some acts follow on in the fatherland that are repugnant to acts had now (if, that is, ‘to see’ and ‘to hold’ are repugnant to the acts ‘to believe’ and ‘to hope’), these following acts do not properly have a suitability to succeed to faith and hope. The proof is that Paul when in rapture [2 Corinthians 12.2-4] had at least the act of vision and yet the habit of faith was not extinguished in him; therefore, the habit of the one is not repugnant to the habit of the other. So faith and hope are not extinguished because something incompossible succeeds to them, but because they would be superfluous.a

a.a [Interpolation] because the acts to which they incline are repugnant to the acts in the fatherland.

12. But there remains still another doubt about the object of these virtues, whether this object is God as he is hidden or is absent (so that hiddenness or absence is the formal idea of the object), or whether the object’s only formal idea is God as God (as was said in d.26 nn.89-105 about the object of faith and hope, and in Prol. nn.151-157, 167, 170 about the first object of hope and the object of theology). If the latter be the case, it does not seem that the habits would lack the formal idea of their object, and so they will be able to remain in the fatherland and to incline us to their proper object. And argument can be made in the same way about acts, namely that the same thing under its proper idea is the object of the habit and of the acts proper to the habit.

13. Besides as was argued at least about hope [d.26 n.97], it seems that hope could incline us to loving what is present and to desiring what is absent.

14. I say that, with respect to the same object and under the same formal idea of object, there can be many acts differing as to being perfect and imperfect (and not only acts of diverse powers ordered to each other but even acts of the same power). But perfect and imperfect are not disposed to each other as greater and lesser in the same species, but as diverse species in the same genus (namely as intermediates and extremes). Thus I say that with respect to God in himself there are not only acts of willing and understanding that are subordinate acts of diverse powers, but there are also acts of loving him in this way or in that, and these acts are different, as it were, not only according to more and less in the same species but as intermediates and extremes in the same genus.

15. This can be applied to the matter at issue because, since the perfection of an act comes from two things, namely from the power and from the object, when the proper idea of one of them varies in itself or also in conjunction with the other cause, or even when close to the other cause (for partial causes act less perfectly with respect to their effects when they are not adequately close to or conjoined with each other), then the perfection of the action will vary. And so it is in the matter at issue.

16. Now, with respect to the act of possession the object of the will is present in itself to it; but with respect to the act of desire it is absent, and it is absent by reason of the formal idea of the act of desire - for the object is not really conjoined in itself with the power. This act of desire, then, is imperfect with respect to the power and is in a different species, and the imperfection belongs to some species intermediate to the extreme - not because of any idea in the object but because of the closeness of the object to the other partial cause, and this closeness is sufficient for making a difference of species in the effects of the two causes. It is like when some action would follow the sun insofar as it is precisely and only present according to a reflected or indirect ray, and some action would follow it only and precisely as it is present in a direct ray; these effects would be distinct in species not by the distinction of the passive thing or of the agent (as to the formal idea of agent), but by the varying closeness of the same agent to the passive thing.

17. When, therefore, the argument is made that the object is formally the same [n.12], I concede this about the object of the virtues in the fatherland. And it does not follow from this that the acts are the same in species, not even the acts that belong to the same power. On the contrary, the acts can be diverse and also have the same force if they are per se about an object diversely present to the power. And from this assertion about the distinction of the acts it seems that a similar distinction can be asserted of the distinction of habits that incline to several such acts; for corresponding to every act of any species in the same rational nature that can be frequently elicited in this way and in that, there can be some habit inclining by regular rule to such acts.

18. Further, as to what was said touching hope [n.13], one can say to it that just as any act distinct from some other act in species can have its own habit in the will and the intellect inclining them to that act, so also there can be one general habit inclining to an act single in genus and many in species - in the way that justice, if it be posited to be a virtue one in genus but not in species, has an act similarly one in genus. In like manner there could be some habit that per se regards God for object insofar as he agrees with rational nature, and thus it could indistinctly incline toward him. And if to these sorts of acts there were a habit inclining to God thus indistinctly, that is, not under the proper idea according to which it is proximate to the power that tends toward God, this habit would not vary whether the power was tending to the object by desiring it or by holding it. This habit is not posited as hope but as a habit precisely inclining to the imperfect act itself that desire is. I concede therefore that there could be a single habit tending to God as he is the advantageous good, and this habit would not have to be extinguished. But hope is posited to be perfectly inclining to an imperfect act, and by an imperfection of a different idea, namely an imperfection coming from the absence of the object in respect of the power tending toward it.

B. On Charity

19. Having seen how faith and hope are extinguished, we must see how charity remains the same in the fatherland and on the way to it. For, suppose that this is the idea of charity, namely that it is friendship with God as he is good in himself. This habit does not incline distinctly to a perfect act of loving God the way he is loved when he is present in himself and perfectly. Nor does it distinctly incline to an imperfect act the way God is loved when he is present imperfectly and in a mirror. Rather it indistinctly inclines to both this act and that.a

a.a [Interpolation] But the inclination to love God in himself will remain in the fatherland; therefore the charity that inclines to such love of him will remain.

20. And that such a habit can be something one has is plain from what was just said of hope [n.18]. For what was said there is more reasonable about a habit tending to God as he is good in himself than of a habit tending to him as he is good for me [the advantageous good]. For the act that tends to God as he is good in himself does not vary according to the perfect or imperfect presence of God the way that the act varies that tends to God as he is an advantageous good. For the first variation [according to the perfect or imperfect presence of God] is either not in species or, if it is, not in a species as remote as the second variation [according to advantageous good]. From the fact then that the inclination to love God in himself will remain in the fatherland, so will remain the inclination to the act posited to belong to charity the way it is posited to be the act of charity; and so the habit will be able to remain.

21. If you say in objection that the presence or variation of such and such an object can vary the act in its species, and so there can be two habits distinct in species, one of which is a principle for loving God in himself as he is present through faith (and this one will be extinguished in the fatherland), and the other of which is a principle for loving God as he is present through vision, and this habit follows on vision - I concede that two such habits can exist together in the will. But here the idea of charity is being posited, not because it would precisely be the principle of an imperfect act about a hidden object, but because it would be indistinctly the principle of an act tending to God as he is good in himself.

C. Conclusion

22. Briefly then about the two appetitive virtues of hope and charity (whatever may hold of faith), it can be conceded that there could be one appetitive habit with respect to the advantageous good that remains in the fatherland (like charity), and that there could be two appetitive habits with respect to God as he is the noble good and as he is the advantageous good, one of which would be extinguished (the way faith is now posited to be extinguished).

23. But we, from the sayings of the saints, are supposing a distinction in these habits of hope and charity, namely that hope does not incline to an act of tending absolutely to the advantageous good but to an imperfect act that comes from the absence of the object; so that the imperfection is not accidental to the act insofar as it belongs to the habit but is essential to it as it is elicited by the habit. But charity, as it is a habit, is a principle of tending to God as he is good in himself, so that perfection and imperfection as coming from the presence and absence of the object are accidental to the act as the act belongs to the habit. But charity inclines to an imperfect act from the absence of the object and to a perfect act from the presence of the object.

II. To the Principal Arguments

24. To the first argument [n.2] I say that the other virtues are ‘in part’ because they essentially include in their acts something that necessarily determines for themselves an imperfection that will in that [future] state be then extinguished. But charity does not necessarily determine its act to anything on which imperfection may follow, but the act, insofar as it belongs to charity, is indifferent, so that the sort of imperfection or perfection posited is accidental to it.

25. As to what is argued against the response given there [n.3] - this response is good insofar as it denies that beatitude can be had here; for although someone might have here a charity equal to what is had in the fatherland, yet not because of this would he be blessed here; for although he might have equal charity, yet he could not now have an equal act as he then will, and beatitude consists in that act. But in answer to the objection itself [n.3] I reply that as perfect an act cannot be had even though the habit be as perfect. For the generating cause of an act of love is not only the one partial cause that is the will, nor even the one partial cause that is charity [cf. I d.17 n.40], but the third cause that is the object present in actual inclination, as was said in Lectura II d.25 nn.69-80; and this third cause is of a determinate perfection according as it is determinately present - if more, more; if less, less. There cannot, by common law, be an object present to a wayfarer the way it is in the fatherland, not even by the presence of the species of it. And therefore it is probable that not only can an equal act not be had but also not an act of the same species. Nor does it follow from this that the habit cannot be equal, because the habit is not the total principle of the act but a partial one. And the habit always gives an act equal to the way it is a principle. For always, as much as is in itself, it gives to its act that the act be a loving of God as God is the supreme good in himself; and the habit does not give to it that it be of God as God is present or absent; nor does it give absolutely the perfection that it has from the object’s being present in this way or that.

26. As to the second argument [n.4], it is plain that although absence is not the formal idea in the object of faith or hope, yet the act of faith is per se such in its species that the imperfection from the determination of its habit necessarily follows it. And therefore faith determinately inclines to an act of a species of the sort for which there cannot be a determination in the fatherland. But charity, although it now concerns what is hidden and consequently something imperfect, does yet not incline to an act thus imperfect but to an act to which imperfection is accidental.

27. To the third [n.5] one can say that things believable have a threefold difference:

For there are some the vision of which per se belongs to beatitude (as is the vision of the Trinity), and these sort are things knowable (using ‘know’ in an extended sense), that is, visible; and they will be seen. And about these believables the statement that ‘vision succeeds to faith’ is to be per se understood [n.11].

There are others the vision of which in some way pertains to beatitude but not essentially; these are also not knowables because they are certain temporal facts, as are things believable about the Incarnation. And about such believables vision does concomitantly succeed to faith, but not indeed vision of the thing in itself (for Christ on the cross or in the womb of the Virgin will not be seen in the fatherland), but in vision in the Word.

Third are believables that are never knowables, because they belong entirely to time and never pertain to beatitude (either principally or concomitantly), of which sort are some other truths pertaining to human acts. And if some wayfarer has faith about such things, one can concede that in him, even in the beatific act, faith can remain.

28. To the final argument about hope [n.6] the answer is plain from what was said in the body of the question [nn.18, 23].